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TORT LAW-THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM'S WRONGFUL CONCEPTION
OF "WRONGFUL LIFE"-Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d
954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Genetic defects and diseases have been recognized for centuries,
but recent advances in the field of genetic research now permit
health care providers to predict whether two individuals are likely to
produce an impaired child. l When testing is performed accurately,
potential parents are afforded the opportunity to consciously decide
whether to conceive a child who might possibly be deformed. But if
a physician is negligent, the parents are denied such a choice and the
birth of a severely handicapped or diseased infant often results. 2
Consequently, the courts have increasingly been called upon to adju
dicate wrongful life suits. 3
There are two different types of wrongful life actions. The first
type involves the birth of a healthy, but unplanned, child. These
cases usually arise as a result of faulty birth control methods, negli
gent sterilization, or illegitimacy.4 The other wrongful life action
involves the birth of a diseased or deformed child. These cases are a
result of a health care provider's failure to warn an infant's parents
I. Peters & Peters, Wrongful Life: Recognizing the Defective Child's Right to a
Cause ofAction, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 857 (1980); Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defin
ing the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488
(1978).
2. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr.477
(1980); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Park v. Chessin, 60 AD.2d 80,
400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), mod(fied, Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
3. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1980); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J.
22, 227 A2d 689 (1967), overruled in part, Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A2d 8
(1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978);
Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80,400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), mod(fied, Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital,
69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
4. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Stills v. Grat
ton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d
240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Williams v. State, 25
A.D.2d 907, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786 (l966),affd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343,276 N.Y.S.2d
885 (1966).
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that there is a substantial likelihood that the child will be born with
some type of disease or deformity.s The scope of this analysis will be
limited to wrongful life suits that are brought by impaired children. 6
The infant plaintiff in such a case claims that if his parents had
been accurately informed that they were likely to produce a de
formed child, either he would never have been conceived or would
have been aborted. 7 The fundamental premise of the child's claim is
that he has been harmed by having been born impaired. s The in
fant does not allege that the physician's negligence caused his im
pairment, rather he argues that the negligence caused his conception
and birth. 9 Thus, the plaintiff does not claim that he was denied the
right to be born "whole", but that he was denied the right not to
have been born at all. lO He views life itself as a compensable injury
and argues that but for the physician's incompetence, he would not
have had to experience the pain and suffering of living in a diseased
or deformed state. II
Recently, the Supreme Court of California considered such a
cause of action for the first time. In Turpin v. Sortini,12 the court
found that impaired life is not always more valuable than nonexis
tence,13 and became the first court in the nation to specifically recog
nize that plaintiffs in wrongful life suits may suffer a compensable
injury, while at the same time denying recovery simply due to the
difficulty of measuring damages.
To fully explain the court's response to this claim, it is necessary
to outline the development of the judiciary's response to wrongful
life claims. The analysis of the Turpin court will then be compared
to the courts' traditional response. Finally, the Turpin court's rea
soning will be critiqued and a viable alternative to its treatment of
the claim for damages will be suggested.
5. See supra note 2.
6. When the birth of a child produces harmful consequences, two different causes
of action may be brought. A ''wrongful life" action may be brought by the child or a
''wrongful birth" action may be brought by the parents. Note, "Wrongful L!fe'~' The
RighI NOllo be Born, 54 TuL. L. REv. 480, 483-85 (1980).
7. Id. at 485.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 485, 491.
10. Id. at 497.
11. Id. at 485, 497.
12. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
13. Id. at 234, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WRONGFUL LIFE

The Supreme Court of California's decision in Turpin repre
sents the typical result in wrongful life suits. Although the rationales
used to support such decisions vary greatly, consistently every state
court of last resort that has considered this issue, has uniformly de
nied the infant's claim for general damages. 14
Under traditional tort principles, a plaintiff can only recover if
he can establish both that he has suffered a legally cognizable injury
and that there is an acceptable method of calculating damages. IS
Courts have justified their denial of damages in wrongful life contro
versies by concluding that either one or both of these conditions has
not been met. 16
The first case to address a wrongful life claim brought by a
physically impaired infant was Gleitman v. Cosgrove,l7 In Gleitman,
the plaintiffs mother contracted German measles while she was
pregnant. IS Because her physician informed her that her unborn
child would not be harmed by the virus, she decided not to seek an
abortion. 19 As a result of this misinformation, she gave birth to a
child who had substantial defects in hearing, sight and speech capa
bilities. 20 The child brought suit claiming wrongful life, but was de
nied relief. 21 The court reasoned that life with defects is always
more precious than not being born at all,22 and that it is "logically
impossible"23 to ''weigh the value of life with impairments against
the nonexistence of life itself'24 in order to calculate damages.
14. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 430, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979); Gleitman v. Cos
grove, 49 N.J. 22, 31, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967), overruled in porI, Berman v. Allan, 80
N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412,386 N.E.2d 807,812,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901; Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 89, 100, 439 A.2d 110, 116, 122
(1981) (by an evenly divided court); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766,
773, 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (1975).
15. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
16. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12 (no cognizable injury is pri
mary concern); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692 (no cognizable
damages); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d at 411-12,386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
900 (neither cognizable injury nor measurable damages); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospi
tal, 69 Wis. 2d at 772-73, 233 N.W.2d at 375-76 (unmeasurable damages).
17. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), overruled inporl, Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,
404 A.2d 8 (1979).
18. 49 N.J. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
19. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
20. Id. at 25, 227 A.2d at 690.
21. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
22. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
23. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
24. Id.
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Courts today are still following either one or both of these
rationales. 25
A decade later, Gleitman was partially overruled by Berman v.
Allan .26 Mrs. Berman became pregnant at age thirty-eight and Dr.
Allan cared for her throughout her pregnancy.27 Although the risk
of bearing a child afllicted with Down's Syndrome28 was substan
tiaP9 for a woman of her age, Dr. Allan failed to either advise her of
the possibility that her child might be born with the aflliction, or
recommend that she undergo the procedure of amniocentesis,30
which is an accurate way of determining whether there may be chro
mosomal abnormalities. 31 Mrs. Berman subsequently gave birth to a
.
daughter who was afllicted with Down's Syndrome. 32
The child sued the doctor on the basis of a wrongful life claim,
but her cause of action was rejected. 33 The court concluded that the
plaintiff had "not suffered any damage cognizable at law by being
brought into existence."34 Yet, the court did make one small step
toward recognizing a cause of action for wrongful life by rejecting
the argument that the difficulty of measuring damages in wrongful
25. See supra notes 14, 16.
26. 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8 (1979).
27. Id. at 423-24, 404 A.2d at 10.
28. Id. at 424, 404 A.2d at 10. Down's Syndrome, which falls within the group of
congenital defects and symptoms seen in mongolism, is "[a] form of idiocy or mental
retardation the physical features of which are characterized by obliquely set eyes, open
mouth, flabby muscles, soft skin, broad face, etc. . . .In most cases there is a chromo
somal abnormality marked by the presence of three number 21 chromosomes (instead of
two)." SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER M-129
(17th ed. 1982). Other abnormalities associated with Down's Syndrome "include re
tarded growth, flat hypoplastic face with short nose, prominent epicanthic skin folds,
protruding lower lip, small rounded ears with prominent antihelix, fissured and thick
ened tongue, laxness of joint ligaments, pelvic dysplasia, broad hands and feet, stubby
fingers usually with dysplasia of the middle phalanx of the fifth finger, transverse palmar
crease, dermatoglyphic changes including distal displacement of the palmar axial
triradius, dry rough skin in older patients and abundant slack neck skin in newborns, and
muscle hypotonia and absence of Moro reflex in newborns. . . ." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1386 (24th ed. 1982).
29. Berman, 80 N.J. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10.
30. Amniocentesis is a "[t]ransabdominal aspiration of fluid from the amniotic
sac." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 53 (24th ed. 1982). "This procedure is used to
remove and study part of the amniotic fluid (the fluid in the 'bag of waters'). . . ."
SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER 53 (17th ed.
1982).
31. 80 N.J. at 424, 404 A.2d at 10.
32. Id.
33. /d. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13.
34. Id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12.
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life suits justified the denial of recovery.35 The court expressly stated
that it "would be extremely reluctant. . . to deny the validity of. . .
[the] complaint solely because damages are difficult to ascertain."36
It went on to state that "were the measure of damages. . . [its] sole
concern, it is possible that some judicial remedy could be fashioned
which would redress [the] plaintiff . . . ."37
The first case in which a court recognized a cause of action for
wrongful life was Park v. Chessin .38 Mrs. Park gave birth to a child
with a kidney ailment and the child died shortly thereafter. 39 Dr.
Chessin negligently assured Mrs. Park that the disease was not he
reditary and that there was only a miniscule chance that she would
subsequently give birth to another child with the same amiction. 40
In reality, the child was afflicted with polycystic kidney disease, a
hereditary and fatal disorder. 41 As a result of Mrs. Park's reliance
on the misdiagnosis, she conceived and gave birth to a second
child.42 That child was also born with polycystic disease and died
two and a half years later. 43 The Parks sued for wrongful life on
behalf of their second child and the court awarded damages for the
pain and suffering that the child had endured during his lifetime. 44
Recovery was based upon "the fundamental right of a child to be
born as a whole, functional human being."45 The very next year,
35. Id. at 428, 404 A.2d at 12.
. 36. Id.
37. £d. (emphasis in original).

38. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified, Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
39. 60 A.D.2d at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at Ill.
40. Id.
41. Polycystic kidney disease is a condition "characterized by. . . multiple cysts of
varying size scattered diffusely throughout both kidneys, resulting in compression and
destruction of kidney parenchyma..." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 747 (24th
ed. 1982). It is "a progressive disease ...resulting in compression and destruction of
k[idney) parenchyma, usually with hypertension, gross hematuria, and uremia . . . ."
Id.
42. 60 A.D.2d at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at Ill.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
45. Id. The court based recovery on the right of a child to be born unimpaired. It
calculated damages by comparing the plaintiffs condition with that of a normal child.
This method penalizes the defendant too heavily. The defendant was negligent in failing
to inform the plaintiffs parents of the possibility that the plaintiff would be impaired, not
in causing the impairment. The defendant caused the plaintiff to be born, but could not
have prevented the deformity. Thus, the proper measure of damages is equivalent to the
value of having not been born at all rather than the value of being born healthy, since the
plaintiff could not have been born healthy under any circumstances. Id.
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however, Gleitman was overruled. 46
The only other decision to recognize a cause of action for
wrongful life was Curlender v. Rio-Science Laboratories. 47 Mr. and
Mrs. Curlender, the plaintiff's parents, retained Bio-Science Labora
tories to administer certain tests designed to determine whether
either of them was a carrier of genes that would result in the concep
tion and birth of a child with Tay-Sachs disease. 48 The laboratory
was negligent in performing the tests and incorrectly informed the
Curlenders that they were not carriers of the disease. 49 Relying upon
this information, they conceived a child who was born with Tay
Sachs disease. 50 The infant sued for wrongful life and the court held
that the child could recover both general damages for pain and suf
fering, and special damages for the costs of treating the disease. 5I
The California court of appeals rejected the argument that a child
born with a serious hereditary defect had not suffered a legally cog
nizable injury.52 The court also refused to adopt the argument that it
was impossible to measure damages in such a case. 53 It specifically
rejected "the notion that a 'wrongful life' cause of action involves
any attempted evaluation of a claimed right not to be bom."54 In
stead, it chose to measure the injury to the child by comparing the
pain and suffering that she would endure during her life, with the
pain and suffering endured by a normal child with an average
46. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
In Becker, the court denied recovery to a plaintiff who was afflicted with Down's Syn
drome. It reasoned that the plaintiff had suffered no legally cognizable injury since a
child does not have a "fundamental right. . . to be born as a whole, functional human
being." Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2 at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. Furthermore, it reasoned that
even if the child was injured, damages were not ascertainable. Id. at 412,386 N.E.2d at
812, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
47. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
48. /d. at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480. Tay-Sachs disease is a "familial disease af
fecting children of various ages, from four months to twelve years. It is characterized by
partial or complete loss of vision, mental underdevelopments, softness of the muscles,
convulsions, etc. Known as Tay-Sachs disease, cerebromacular degeneration, and Bat
ten-Mayou's disease." SCHMIDT, ArrORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD
FINDER A-141 (17th ed. 1982) (emphasis omitted). Tay-Sachs disease is an infantile type
of "cerebral sphingolipidosis." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1314 (24th ed. 1982).
Cerebral sphingolipidosis refers to "anyone of a group of inherited diseases character
ized by failure to thrive, hypertonicity, progressive spastic paralysis ... occurrence of
blindness, usually with macular degeneration and optic atrophy . . . ." Id.
49. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
52. /d. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
53. Id. at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
54. Id. at 830-31, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
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lifespan. 55
III.

THE TURPIN DECISION

The first wrongful life suit to reach the Supreme Court of Cali
fornia was Turpin v. Sortini.56 Mr. and Mrs. Turpin brought their
first and only child to Dr. Adam Sortini, a hearing specialist, for
diagnosis of a possible hearing defect. 57 Although Sortini concluded
that the child's hearing was normal, she was actually totally deaf due
to a hereditary ailment. 58 Relying upon the negligent diagnosis, the
Turpins conceived a second child, Joy, who was afDicted with the
same hereditary deafness. 59 The Turpins brought suit on behalf of
Joy alleging that, had they known oftheir first daughter'S true condi
tion, they would never have conceived a second child. 60 Joy sought
general damages for the pain and suffering that she experienced as a,
result of being born deaf, as well as special damages to cover the
extraordinary costs of treating the amiction. 61
The court first evaluated the claim for general damages. It
found that the defendant owed a duty of care to Joy because it was
reasonably foreseeable that any offspring of the Turpins' would be
directly affected by their failure to discover the hereditary condi
tion. 62 In addition, it found "that Joy's birth was a proximate result
of the breach" of that duty of care. 63 It failed, however, to find that
Joy had suffered any measurable injury as a result of the breach. 64
In analyzing the element of damages, the court specifically rec
ognized that it "seems doubtful that a child's. claim for general dam
ages should properly be denied on the rationale that the value of
impaired life, as a matter of law, always exceeds the value of non
life. . . ."65 The court realized that there may be cases in which the
child would be better off had he not been bom. 66 Thus, it became
55.
used an
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.

65.
66.

Id. at 831,165 Cal. Rptr. at 489. Just like the Park court, the Curlender court
incorrect method of calculating damages. See supra note 45.
31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
Id. at 224, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 230, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
Id.
Id. at 237, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
Id. at 234, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
Id.
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the first court, using the proper standard for measuring damages,67 to
conclude that it is possible for plaintiffs in wrongful life cases to suf
fer a legally cognizable injury while at the same time denying a
remedy.68
The court declined to award general damages because it be
lieved that it would be "impossible to determine in any rational or
reasoned fashion whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury
in being born impaired rather than not being born . . . ."69 Fur
thermore, the court argued that, even if it were possible to determine
if any harm existed, it would be "impossible to assess general dam
ages in any fair, nonspeculative manner."70
In regard to special damages, the court held that a child could
recover out-of-pocket expenses for treatment of a hereditary ail
ment.7) The court reasoned that, unlike the claim for general dam
·ages, special damages were easily determined and measured.72
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk suggested that the ma
jority's analysis ignored the established tort principal that every
harm deserves a remedy.?3 He thought that an innocent plaintiff
should not have to suffer simply because the injury was difficult to
assess. 74
IV.

ANALYSIS: ESTABLISHING AND MEASURING THE HARM

Before a plaintiff can be awarded damages, the court must find
that he has actually been harmed and the harm must be measurable.
The courts have denied recovery in wrongful life suits for three ma
jor reasons. Some reason that a plaintiff "has not suffered any dam
age cognizable at law by being brought into existence."75 Others
maintain that even if a harm exists, there is no possible way of mea
suring it.76 Finally, another group of courts have granted recovery,
but have measured damages by employing an improper standard. 77
67. See supra note 45.
68. 31 Cal. 3d at 234-35, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346 (1982).
69. Id. at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 239,643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 241, 643 P.2d at 967, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 350 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 240, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
75. Berman, 80 N.J. 421, 429, 404 A.2d 8, 12.
76. Turpin,31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954-55, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337-38; Gleitman, 49
N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689.
77. Cur/ender, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811-13, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477; Park, 60 A.D.2d 80,
400 N.Y.S.2d 110; See supra note 45 and infra note 80.
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In reviewing the major cases dealing with wrongful life, it be
comes clear that the courts have made some small advances toward
recognizing the cause of action. Yet, no court has adopted a satisfac
tory method of assessing the plaintiffs' damages. 78 All of the theories
that have been employed seem to be flawed in one way or another. 79
Although it is unfair to make the defendant pay damages that would
return the plaintiff to a position that he could never have occupied,80
it is equally unjust to totally preclude a plaintiff from recovering any
damages. 81 It is absolutely necessary to formulate a method of de
termining the existence and extent of damages that is fair to both the
plaintiff and the defendant.
A.

Establishing the Harm

Many arguments for the denial of damages have rested on the
premise that all life, no matter how impaired, is better than no life at
all. 82 Thus, it is asserted that the wrongful life plaintiff suffers no
legally cognizable injury.83 The child's preference for nonexistence
is seen as devaluating the sanctity of life.84
Decisions in "right to die" cases have rejected the premise that
life is always more valuable than nonexistence and have deferred the
choice to the impaired individua1. 85 Yet, most courts continue to ad
here to the argument that public policy supports an assignment of
paramount value to the life in all circumstances. 86 Although these
78. The only cases in which the courts have even attempted to formulate a method
of assessing damages are Park and Curlender. See supra notes 38-55 and accompanying
text.
79. See supra note 77.
80. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 232,643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344. It is unfair to
force the defendant to pay damages equal to the value of the difference between normal
life and impaired life since the defendant caused the plaintiff to be born, but did not
cause the impairment. Id.
8!. Capron, Tort Liability and Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 618, 657
(1979). !fit is obvious that the plaintiff has suffered an injury by being born, it is unjust
to totally preclude recovery simply because damages are difficult to ascertain. Id.
82. Berman, 80 N.J. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12; Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at
693.
83. Berman, 80 N.J. at 421, 404 A.2d at 8; Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 22, 227 A.2d at 689.
84. Berman, 80 N.J. at 430,404 A.2d at 13; Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at
693.
85. Courts dealing with the right to die have recognized the individual's right to
determine whether the value of life outweighs the value of nonexistence. Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427
(1977); Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976), cert. denied,429
U.S. 922 (1976).
86. Berman, 80 N.J. at 426-30, 404 A.2d at 12-13; see, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, 497
Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (by an evenly divided court).
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courts recognize the fact that "decisional law must keep pace with
expanding technological, economic and social change",87 they
choose to ignore the fact that public policy in this area has
changed. 88 Because the main advantage of the common law system
is its inherent adaptability to change,89 courts should cease to rely
upon outdated theories of public policy in order to support their
decisions.
Although the defendant's negligence sometimes confers a bene
fit upon the plaintiff by enabling him to be born, this benefit does not
always outweigh the burden that the child must bear as a result of
his affiiction. 90 It is obvious that "[eJxistence in itself can hardly be
characterized as an injury, but when existence is foreseeably and in
extricably coupled with a disease, such an existence, depending on
the nature of the disease, may be intolerably burdensome."91
If the plaintiff's parents have alleged that they would either
have avoided conception or aborted had the physician given them
accurate information regarding the likelihood of deformity, the
courts should allow a jury to decide the question of whether the
plaintiff has actually been harmed by having been born, rather than
denying recovery as a matter of law.92 The jury would then deter
mine whether a reasonable person, with the plaintiff's impairment,
would prefer to never have been bom. 93 The trier of fact should be
allowed to determine whether the infant actually suffered an in
jury.94 The question should be viewed not as a question of law, but
as a question of fact. The courts should not be allowed to inject their
moral judgments regarding the sanctity of life in order to bar recov
ery in every case, regardless of the compelling nature of that case. 95
Injury to the child should be determined on a case by case basis,
87. Park, 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
88. See supra note 85; see also Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 233, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal.
Rptr. at 345. "[A)t least in some situations-public policy supports the right of each
individual to make his or her own determination as to the relative value of life and
death." Id.
89. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law §§ I, 2 (1976).
90. Speck v. FinegOld, 497 Pa. 77, 87, 439 A.2d 110, 115 (1981).
91. Id. (Opinion in opposition to the result reached in this case).
92. Peters & Peters, supra note I, at 865-66. Whether the jury or a judge acts as the
trier of fact in a particular case, each case should be decided on its merits, rather than
judicially foreclosing recovery as a matter of law. Id.
93. Comment, "Wrongful L!fe'~' The RighI Nollo he Born, 54 TuL. L. REv. 480,
498 (1980).
94. Peters & Peters, supra note I, at 866.
95. Id.
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rather than by assuming that life is never an intolerable burden. 96
The court in Turpin rejected the argument that life is always
sacred and recognized that, "[a]lthough it is easy to understand and
to endorse these decisions' desire to affirm the worth and sanctity of
less-than-perfect life, we question whether these considerations alone
provide a sound basis for rejecting the child's tort action."97 They
also found that public policy sometimes supports the righ~ of the in
dividual to "make his or her own determination as to the relative
values of life and death. "98 They concluded their analysis by stating:
"[c]onsidering the short life span of many of these children and their
frequently very limited ability to perceive the benefits of life, we can
not assert with confidence that in every situation there would be a
societal consensus that life is preferable to never having been born at
all."99
By concluding that it is possible for a plaintiff in a wrongful life
suit to suffer an injury, the Turpin court rejected the notion that im
paired life is always more valuable than nonexistence. tOO Yet, it
failed to grant a remedy solely due to the difficulty of measuring
damages. lOt
B.

M,easuring the Harm

Even if a court accepts the argument that it is possible that a
plaintiff in a wrongful life suit could suffer harm in certain cases,
there is still another barrier for the plaintiff to overcome. The court
must also be convinced that it is possible to ascertain whether the
plaintiff has been harmed by being born and to what extent}02 The
court in Turpin, like many other courts,103 refused to believe that it
96. Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 87, 439 A.2d 110, 115 (1981) (opinion in opposi
tion to the result reached in this case).
To judicially foreclose consideration of whether life in a particular case is such
a burden would be to tell the diseased, possibly deformed plaintiff that he can
seek no remedy in the courts and to imply that his alternative remedy, in the
extreme event that he finds his life unduly burdensome, is suicide. No court in
the land would directly send such a message to these plaintiffs. [It is] unfortu
nate that some courts have indeed sent that message by implication.
Id.
97. 31 Cal. 3d at 232-33,643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
98. Id. at 233, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345; see supra note 85.
99. Id. at 234, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
100. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
IO\. 31 Cal. 3d at 234-35, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 547-48 (Ala. 1978); Gleitman, 49
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was possible to assess damages in an accurate manner.l04 It argued
that it is "impossible to determine in any rational or reasoned fash
ion whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury in being born
impaired rather than not being bom".lOs The court further stated
that even if it were possible to determine when a harm existed, it was
"impossible to assess general damages in any fair, nonspeculative
manner."I06 Because both issues are resolved by applying the same
formula, a comparison between the benefit of living, and the burden
of being impaired, they will be considered together.
The Turpin court held that wrongful life damages could not be
calculated by juries because the value of nonexistence was not within
the experience or imagination of any person. 107 Therefore, the court
reasoned that it would be impossible for the jury to balance the ben
efit') of living against the burdens of being impaired, in order to
quantify the harm. \08
This argument can be refuted in three ways. First, it is obvious
that in the vast majority of tort cases the jury can only imagine what
the plaintiffs life was like both before and after the injury. \09 It
would be a very unusual case indeed if one or more members of the
jury had experienced a life just like the plaintiffs before he was in
jured and then suffered an injury which was very similar to the
plaintiffs. I10 Thus, in virtually every tort case, the members of the
jury must judge whether the plaintiff has been harmed and the extent
of the damage solely by listening to various types of testimony and
making a determination based upon common sense and an assess
ment of the witnesses' credibility rather than by relating the plain
tiffs injuries to their own past experience. HI
Secondly, juries regularly assess the amount of damages in
wrongful death cases. In these suits, the jury must make the same
t;omparison as is required in a wrongful life suit. The jury must
measure damages by comparing the value of either impaired or
N.J. at 26, 227 A.2d at 692; Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 402, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
900.

104. 31 Cal. 3d at 23S, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
lOS. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 23S-36, 643 P.2d at 963-64, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47 (quoting Speck v.
Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 372, 408 A.2d 496, SI2 (Spaeth, J., concurring and dissent
ing), a./!'d, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).).
108. Id See also infra notes IIS-27 and accompanying text.
109. See infra note 113.
110. See supra note 81, at 6S8.
Ill. Bryan v. Ross, 236 S.C. 299, 304, 114 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1960).
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healthy life with the value of nonexistence. 112 If the jury is capable
of making this comparison in wrongful death suits, there is no reason
to doubt their ability to make the same comparison in wrongful life
suits.
Finally, juries are called upon to assess damages in other situa
tions in which the position of the plaintiff is very similar to a state of
nonexistence. For example, juries are often called upon to measure
the extent of injuries to plaintiffs who are comatose or severely brain
damaged. l13 In such cases, the jury must compare a state of bare
existence with that of a healthy existence. 114 These conditions are
very close to nonexistence, yet, juries regularly assess damages for
these types of injuries.
In order for a jury to perform its proper function in determining
damages, it is necessary to formulate some guidelines for it to fol
10W. 115 Because juries are able to apply basic tort principles to other
intangible injuries, that are equally beyond their powers of compre
hension,116 there is no reason why these standards cannot be em
ployed to determine the proper recovery in wrongful life suits. I 17
The traditional tort remedy is compensatory in nature. I IS Dam
ages are awarded in an attempt to place the plaintiff in the position
that he would have occupied but for the tortious act of the defend
ant.I 19 By this standard, damages for wrongful life would be
equivalent to the value of the benefit of never having been born.
See JUpra note 81 at 649; see infra note 142.
lB. In Gainar v. S.S. Longview Victory, 226 F. Supp. 912, 917 (E.D. Va. 1964),
the jury was allowed to assess damages to a plaintiff who "exists 'in body' but without the
ability to function as a normal man . . . [whose] total reaction makes him little more
than flesh and bones which need attention for the balance of his life." In Myers v.
Karchmer, 313 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1958), the court affirmed a $150,000 jury verdict to a
plaintiff with complete mental and physical disability and loss of control of his kidneys.
The court in Wolf v. General Mills, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 996, 231 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1962),
affirmed a $500,000 jury verdict to a plaintiff who was brain damaged as a result of a
skull injury. The accident caused mental feebleness, impaired memory, loss of taste and
smell, difficulty in hearing, total loss of sight in one eye and partial loss of sight in the
other, total loss of hearing in one ear and draining of the other, facial paralysis and other
injuries. In Seattle-First National Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288,367 P.2d 835 (1962),
the negligence of a doctor caused a pre-natal injury which resulted in permanent brain
damage and cerebral palsy. In assessing damages, the jury compared the plaintiff's de
gree of intelligence with that of a normal child. Id. at 841, 59 Wash. 2d at 296.
114. Id.
115. Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful L!fe'~' (A Suggested Analysis), 55
MINN. L. REV. 58, 65-66 (1970).
116. See infra notes 138-42.
117. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 50, 227 A.2d at 704.
118. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971).
119. Id.
112.
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The first step in ascertaining the extent of the injury would be to
compare the condition that the child would have occupied had the
defendant not been negligent, with the impaired condition which he
now occupies as a result of the negligent act.120 This involves bal
ancing the value of nonexistence against the value of an impaired
existence. 121 The second step would be to determine whether the
defendant had conferred any benefit upon the plaintiff by causing
his birth. Tort law requires that the value of any benefit conferred
upon the plaintiff be considered in mitigation of damages whenever
it is equitable to do SO.122
Essentially, a jury's task would be to balance the burdens and
benefits in each case. The burden of living with an impairment
would be balanced against the benefit, if any, that could be attrib
uted to the joy of living. 123 Where a child's impairment is slight, the
benefit of having been born would surely outweigh the injury, and
no damages would be awarded. 124 Where a child is very severely
impaired, however, the benefit of living might be negligible. 125 In
such a situation it would be proper to award damages. 126 As the
impairment becomes more severe, life becomes less precious and the
recovery of a larger award is justified. 127
The court in Turpin declined to apply such a formula because
"a rational, nonspeculative determination of a specific monetary
award in accordance with normal tort principles appears to be
outside the realm of human competence."128 By denying a remedy,
after acknowledging that an injury may exist, the court violated the
basic tort principle that there should be a remedy for every wrong. 129
This principle is so basic to the concept of justice that it has been
asserted that it is the very thread of our society.130 From "the earli
est days of organized society it became apparent to man that society
could never become a success unless the collectivity of mankind
guaranteed to every member of society a remedy for a palpable
120. See supra note 115, at 64.
121. Id.
122. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979).
123. See supra note 115.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 66.
127. Id.
128. 31 Cal. 3d at 236, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
129. See supra note 73; see also Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555,
563 (1931); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 738-39, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79
(1968).
130. FlagieUo v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 417 Pa. 486, 489, 208 A.2d 193, 195 (1965).
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wrong inflicted on him by another member of that society."'31
The difficulty of measuring damages should not be the basis for
a total denial of recovery. If it is determined that "a claim is legally
cognizable, mere difficulty in the ascertainment of damages should
be insufficient to preclude the action."132
Our legal system does not require that the damages in every
case be ascertainable to the extent that it provides an exact figure
representing the proper remedy. The United States Supreme Court
has stated that "[t]he rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain
damages applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong,
not to those damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong
and only uncertain in respect of their amount."133 In most wrongful
life cases, there is no doubt that the physician proximately caused
the child to be born. Yet the courts continue to bar recovery even
though damages are only uncertain as to their amount. 134 It is ex
tremely unjust to the injured infant to require a degree of precision
that the law of torts does not demand. 135 The plaintiff should not be
barred from recovery due to the unfortunate circumstances that he
was the victim of a tortious act which produces injuries that are diffi
cult to quantify.136 Indeed, it almost seems illogical to argue that we
should grant no remedy at all simply because it is difficult to quanti
fy the proper amount of compensation.
The Turpin court denied the plaintiff a remedy based upon the
argument that any award would be speculative. '37 Yet, wrongful life
131. Id. at 490,208 A.2d at 195.
132. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 542 (D.S.C., 1980).
133. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931).
134. See supra note 3.
135. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931). "Where the
tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages
with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all
relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend
for his acts. In such cases, while the damages may not be determined by mere specula
tion or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show[s) the extent of the damages as a
matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result is only approximate. The
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness
and precision that would be possible if the case, which he alone is responsible for mak
ing, were otherwise." Id.
136. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 738-39, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79
(1968). "[T]he application of tort law can never be a matter of mathematical precision.
In terms of characterizing conduct as tortious and matching a money award to the injury
suffered as well as in fixing the extent of the injury, the process cannot be perfect . . . .
Yet we cannot let the difficulties of adjudication frustrate the principle that there be a
remedy for every substantial wrong." Id.
137. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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damages are no more speculative or difficult to measure than those
awarded for injuries such as loss of earning capacity,138 decreased
life expectancy,139 loss of consortium,14O emotional distress, 141 or
wrongful death.142 "Surely a judicial system engaged daily in evalu
ating such matters as pain and suffering, which admittedly have 'no
known dimensions, mathematical or financial' should be able to
evaluate the harm which proximately resulted from the breach of
duty [in wrongful life cases]."143 It would be no more difficult for a
jury to establish a monetary amount representing the difference be
tween defective existence and nonexistence than for it to assess the
value of these other intangible injuries. Although the Turpin court
concluded that wrongful life damages would be too speculative l44
the fact remains that the necessary computations are similar to other
situations in the field of torts in which it is difficult, but certainly not
impossible, to ascertain damages. 145

138. In Wilson v. Northland Greyhound Lines, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 667, 675 (D.C.
Mont. 1958), the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to be compensated not only for
loss of earning capacity, but also for destruction of the capacity to pursue an established
course of life.
139. In Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960), the plaintiff was
even allowed to recover for premature symptoms of aging.
140. In Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel, 12 Cal. 3d 382,525 P.2d 669, liS Cal. Rptr.
765 (1974) the plaintiff was granted damages for loss of consortium after her husband
was severely injured after a steel beam fell on him while he was working.
141. In Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), a
mother who saw her child struck and killed by a car was allowed to recover for negligent
inftiction of emotional distress even though she did not have any reason to fear for her
own safety.
142. Juries have been given great latitude in assessing damages in wrongful death
suits. City of Louisville v. Stuckenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94 (Ky. 1968) (granting damages for
the wrongful death of a four day old child). In wrongful death suits, the jury calcula.tes
damages by comparing the values of existence and nonexistence. To aid in this determi
nation, the parties may submit evidence of the value of the decedent's life.
"A plaintiff undoubtedly has the right in a wrongful death case to produce evi
dence as to the age, health and activity of the decedent and other facts to show
that a decedent would have lived a long time had his death not been accelerated
by the wrongful act, and a defendant has the right in mitigation of damages to
show the age, weakness, diseased condition, impaired earning power or lack of
activity of decedent or any other facts tending to prove that the decedent would
have lived only a very short time had his death not been so accelerated."
Larrissey v. Norwalk Truck Lines, ISS Ohio St. 207, 215, 98 N.E.2d 419, 424 (1951).
143. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 50, 227 A.2d at 704 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (quoting Botta
v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 95, 138 A.2d 713, 720 (1958).).
144. See supra notes 106, 128 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 113, 138-42.
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of California had a chance to lead the way
toward fairness by becoming the first state supreme court to recog
nize a cause of action for wrongful life. Instead, it only went half
way. While it recognized that the infant plaintiffs sometimes do suf
fer a legally cognizable injury, it declined to endorse a solution to the
problem. Rather than attempting to formulate an equitable method
of assessing damages, it concluded that it was impossible for juries to
assess damages in wrongful life suitS.l46 The time has come for the
status quo to change, and for the injured plaintiffs' rights to relief to
be recognized. The issue of damages should be decided by our ju
ries, as it is in other tort cases. Damages can and should be assessed
according to the traditional tort framework by balancing the benefit
of living against the burden borne by the impaired plaintiff. The
difficulty of ascertaining th~ existence of and measuring damages
should not preclude the granting of a remedy in those cases in which
actual injury is established. Justice requires that the defendants in
wrongful life suits be required to redress the injuries that they have
inflicted and that the impaired plaintiffs be compensated for their
suffering.
Dawn E Currier

146.

31 Cal. 3d at 234-35, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.

